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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of th.e 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 8740 
------------0------------
REx HoLLAND; REx HoLLAND, AdministTator with the Will 
.A.nnexecl of the:. Estate of J OH:K G. HoLLAND, Deceased, 
Plai1tti ff s and A tJpellants, 
vs. 
ARTHUR E. JYioRE.TON, ETHEL T. MoRETON, also known as 
E. T. 1\1oRETON, JoHN R. :J·foRETON, also known as J. R. 
1\IoREToN, RosE ANN P. ~!IoRETON, SusAN JYioRETON TEvrs, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
------------0------------
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
(Note: Numbers in parentheses 1·efer to pages of 
the record. The parties will be referred 
to here as they appeared in the Trial Court. 
Thus, .A.ppellants' original brief will be re-
ferred to as ''Pl. Br.' ~ and Respondents' 
Brief as '' Dfts. Br.'' .A.ll emphasis, unless 
otherwise indicated, will be supplied.) 
Preliminary Remarks 
Defendant Arthur E. ~Ioreton is completely unmasked by 
his own brief. In it he indulges in complete misst~atements 
of the law, of the Record, and of Plaintiffs' position. Al-
though the trial court rendered no opinion and never ex-
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plained its action/ he indulges in unwarranted and. invalid 
speculation as to what were the trial court's reasons for 
its action. In desperation, he even resorts to the cus~tomary 
refuge of the wrongdoer and charges his victim with ex-
tortion and perjury ( Dfts. Br. 33, 41, 59). 
Notwithstanding all this, it is inescapable-even on the 
basis of his own brief-that )ioreton ha.s been guilty of 
professional misconduct of the most reprehensible sort. It 
is further inescapable that, in dismissing the action of 
Rex HolLand (both individually and as Administrator) 
against Defendants Ethel T., John R. and Rose Ann P. 
Moreton, and Sus~n Moreton Tevis, and in granting De-
fendant Arthur E. :\1oreton's motion for a directed verdict 
and entering a judgment for Defendant Arthur E. Moreton, 
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, the trial court com-
mitte~d serious error. 
The error is particularly ag·grava ted in this case, in 
that it appears that the trial court failed to apply to this 
case not only the lav\; applicable to actions involving a con-
fidential relationship, but also failed to apply important 
rules as to the relationship of ~ittorney and Client an-
nounced by this Court and all other courts, ''founded upon 
principles of public policy'' and designed to ''serve various 
purposes, among them to prevent the dishonest practitioner 
from fraudulent conduct * * * and to foster respect for the 
profession and the courts * * *.' ~ J/ alia v. Giles. 100 Utah 
562, 114 P. 2nd 208, 212; Gillette Y. A'euJzouse Realty Co., 
75 Utah 13, 282 P. 776, 779. 
1 Except that as to his distnissal of the action by Rex Holland, 
as Adn1inistrator ~ Judge Hanson tnentioned a one-year statute of 
limitations. Sec. 78-12-37 (see Pl. Br. 58-59) and lack of proper 
authorization (see Pl. Br. 60-61). 
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Even under Defendants' own version of the facts (which 
the jury obviously found was not the true version), and eiVen 
under Defendants' own version of the law (which is not the 
applicable version), the action of thP trial court was 
not justified and was e1Toneous as a matter of law. 
I. 
Replying to Defendants' Contention That There 
Was No Confidential Relationship (Dfts. Br. 
Point I) 
(a) 
'' *~ ,r.: ::-:, The general meaning of the term 'practice 
law' or 'practice of la\v' is common knowledge, 
although the boundaries of its definition may be in-
definite * :::, * it is not confined to performing services 
,x, * * in courts of justice :\{: ~"' 'x· it i.ncludes * * * the 
prepa.ration of legal instrzunents and contracts, by 
which legal rights are secured * * *." 7 C. J. 8. 
Attorney and Client, Sec. 3g, p. 703. 
''The vvord 'attorney' signifies in its broadest 
sense a substitute or agent ;r,. * ,:.c.'' 7 C. J. 8. Attor-
ney and Client, Sec. 1, p. 702. 
''Generally speaking the relation of an attorney 
and client is a matter of contract * * *. Thus the 
contract of emplo;I}Jnent t'n general consists of an 
offer or request by the client anrl an acceptance or 
assent by the attorney) or of an offer by the a.ttorney 
and acceptance of the offer by the client * * 'r.. The 
contract m.a.u be express or implied, and it is suffi-
cient tha.t the advice ond assistarnce of the attorney 
is sought and receiued in 1natters pertinent to his 
profession." 7 C. J. /{Attorney a.nd Client, Sec. 65, 
p. 848. 
We have previously listed some 15 separate legal docu-
ments which were prepared by the defendant Moreton for 
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use in connection with the acquisition and transfer of the 
various interests involved in this litigation (see- Pl. Br. pp. 
22-23). ThHre is no que~tion but that these were documents 
''by which legal rights aTe secured.'' Moreton himself 
testified that these documents were absolutely binding" 
(R. 593).2 
All of these documents were of course prepared by 
Moreton following his first meeting· with the co-owners in 
the Spring (April) of 1946, when :\Ioreton made an offer 
to serve as the attorney for the the,n co-owners of theM & 
H claims in patenting those claims and in selling those 
claims, and when his offer to that effect was fully and com-
pletely accepted by the Plaintiffs-thereby creating beyond 
question the contract of employment, and giving rise to 
the Attorney-and-Client relationship. Thus testifying as 
to this very first meeting between Plaintiffs and l\Ioreton 
(R. 331 to 337)-the date of which ''as firmly fixed as a 
result of repeated interruptions from Defendant's Counsel 
2 As indicated, the trial court rendered no opinion setting forth 
the reasons underlying its action. However, some clue or explana-
tion as to what caused it to commit such serious error in a case so 
affected with public interest may, perhaps. be suggested by the -fol-
lowing (R. 595-596): 
"Q. (By 1\Ir. Pollack)*** I forget \vhat your answer was 
with respect to whether these \vere l~o-al documents that you 
drew? 
l\1r. Gustin: \Vhat do you mean by that? We object to 
the fonn of the question. 'Legal documents has a connota-
tion that \vould cover every \vriting e.,"(cept regarding a book. 
Mr. Pollack: * * * I think the e.~pression 'legal documents' 
has a well recognized connotation. 
Mr. Gustin: Your Honor, I object to it. 
The Court: Rephrase your question. It is confusing to me, 
Mr. Pollack. 
Mr. Gustin: That is, I don't believe-
The Court: The objection is sustained." 
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as being in the S.pring (April) of 1946 (R. 334-335~), Reoc 
Holland stated as foUows (R. 337): 
"He (Moreton) told us at that time (the time of 
the first conversation; i.e., the Spring of 1946) that 
he, \Vhen \Ve started on this patent, that he would be 
our attorney, that he \vould be our attorney in get-
ting the patent and that he \Vould also be, our attor-
ney in the sale of these properties.'' 
This testimony was never denied. Moreton, In all 
the days he wa.s on the stand, never denied that at the 
very first meeting in April 1946 he had told Plaintiffs he 
was going to be their attorney in getting the patent and 
in selling the properties. 3 
(b) 
In their brief, Defendants completely ignore such evi-
dence as the foregoing, which is clear and undisputed on the 
a Rex Holland and the defendant Moreton, of course, both testi-
fied that every time there was a conversation, everything was reduced 
to writing (R. 318-319, 592). Thus, that testimony, taken together 
with the uncontradicted testimony of Rex just quoted, clearly sus-
tained a finding that the employ,ment contract entered into at this first 
meeting between M:oreton and his clients and giving rise to the 
Attorney-Client relationship, had in fact been reduced to writing 
and was actually contained in the first legal document which the 
defendant Moreton prepared-the first Option Agreement of the 
Spring of 1946. Plaintiffs, of course, as even the defendant Moreton 
was forced to adtnit, were never given and have never had a copy 
of this docutnent ( R. 335, 657-658). And Moreton (who produced 
every scrap of paper he felt would be helpful to him) now clain1s 
he has "lost" the original ( R. 612-615) . He was unable to tell when 
he first noticed it was "missing" from his files (R. 615). Significant!)') 
he did not even atte1npt any explanation of how or why it was that. 
of all the documents he himself prepared and kept) this 1nost critical 
docuntent-the first option-'was the only one that 'ltras ((missing)). 
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Record. They urge that there was no Attorney-Client re-
lationship and not Hven a Principal-and-Agent relations·hip, 
ignoring that More,ton himself testified that therH were no 
negotiations for the sale of Plaintiffs' interest in the M & H 
propertie:S other than the negotiations carried on onJy 
through Moreton (R. 821). They argue that all the docu-
me·nts drawn by Moreton did not require the particular 
skill of an attorney and could have been drawn by the 
Hollands and Murie themselves (Dfts. Br. 32), ignoring 
the fact that practically every legal document-e.g., Wills, 
Contracts, Leases, etc.-can theoretically and within the 
realm of possibility be dra~vn by a layman, but that never-
theless the public at large generally recognizes that it is 
be~tter to employ and does employ a lawyer for the prepara-
tion of such documents; and that, as indicated, the prepara-
tion of such docwnents constitutes ''the practice of law.'' 
They even ignore the fact that Moreton himself recognized 
Plaintiffs were lacking in the necessary skill for preparing 
such documents, whe~n on July 5, 1936, he wrote them 
(R. 644) that: 
"It is important that you advise me promptly by 
return mail, and if you have received the notices 
(Notices of Exemption) back again from the Re-
corder, please fo'ru;arrl then~ to ,n~e, so tha,t I may see 
that they are in proper fottJn." 4 
4 In this san1e letter of July 5, 1946 Moreton warned and instructed 
the co-owners against discussing their price for their property with 
anyone else and told them to leave such matters entirely up to him 
(R. 640-641, 644). This letter was produced at Moreton's deposition 
and quoted in full therein but Moreton did not produce it at the 
trial ( R. 637). Thus, its contents were placed on the record only 
upon Moreton being confronted ·with his deposition ( R. 636-644). 
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Defendants also ignore the fact that when Moreton wrote 
to the co-owners, he wrote them on his legal statione~ry, 
holding himself out as an attorney -at-law ( R. 660-661) ; and 
that Rex-in his lettHr to H. L. Waldthausen, Jr., the min-
ing engineer for Kais,er Steel (Ex. D. 36)-Teferred in 
capital letters to Moreton a's the 
"ATTORNEY AT LAvv, JUDGE BuiLDING, SALT LAKE 
CITY, U TAI-I, who \Vill handle all busine,ss connected 
vvith the sale of this property.'' (R. 470) 
Defendants even ignore the fact that in about August, 
1947, Moreton advised Plaintiffs as to the giving of a rig-ht 
of way to the U n~on Pacific over other properties bH1ong-
ing to Plaintiffs and adjoining the M & H claims (R. 367-
3,68) ; and that Moreton at the trial claimed credit for pro-
curing a release in Novembe-r, 1948 from one Arthur (Ex. D. 
50), thus settling· a piece of threatened litigation involving 
an alleged cloud upon Plaintiffs' title to the M & H prop-
erties (R. 418, 593, 77 4); and that Moreton himself testified 
that in October, 1948 he had received an a.bstr~act of the 
title to Plaintiffs' property and that he had examined the 
title and passed on it (R. 792). 
(c) 
While Defendants' Brief ignores the~se matters by not 
mentioning the·m, Defendants seek to deny them any effect 
or significance by erroneouS'ly arguing that the Attorne,y-
Client relationship is unimportant unless it is. shown that 
the relationship existed at the time the very first Option 
Agreement was made, in the Spring of 1946 (Dft. Br. 26, 
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33, 38) ; that otherwise eve~rything that occurred in thH first 
conversation in the Spring of 1946 was nothing more than 
a simple business transaction ( Dfts. Br. 27, 28, 29, 36, 39, 
42); that Moreton's entire oom.p·ensation was fixed at that 
time (Dfts. Br. 31, 42) and since there was no Attorney-
Client relationship existing when such compensation was 
fixed, Moreton was under no fiduciary obligation to his 
clie,nts and was entitled to drive the best bargain he could 
(Dfts. Br. 34, 35, 42). 
In the cours.e of this erroneous contention, Defendants 
are guilty of what appear to be important and deliberate 
dis.tortions of the Record. Thus Defendants state (Dfts. 
Br. 33) that the initial conversation between Plaintiffs and 
Moreton which Rex Holland testified to (quoted above), 
giving rise to Moreton's employment as Plaintiff's attorney, 
took place not in April of 1946 but in March, 1947. 
No plainer misst~tement is conceivable. The line of 
questioning during which Rex Holland testified about More-
ton's offer to act as Plaintiffs' attorney, and their accep-
tance of that offe~r, begins with line 8 on page 331 of the 
Record and continue·s to line 26 on page 337. It is crystal-
clear, throughout, that Rex is being questioned about the 
very first meeting with Moreton in the Spring of 1946. 
This appears not only at the very outset of the line of 
que·stioning (R. 331) but at other points as well (R. 334,335, 
336, 337). It is hard to believe Defendants' counsel could 
be confus:e:d on this s.core, since his frequent intel'Tuptions 
to .the que.s-tioning we1·e helpful in firmly fixing the date 
of the conversation involved in the testimony as being in 
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the Spring (April) of 1946 (R. 334, lines 22 to 27; R. 334, 
line 29, to R. 335, line< 1, and R. 335, line-s 14 to 16).5 
Defendants' second important misstatement of thH Rec-
ord in their attempt to avoid the effe:et of the undisputed 
evidence as to the confidential relationship- lie-s. in De-
fendants' va.rious statements and sugge~stions. and innuendos 
throughout their brief ( Dfts. Br. 31, 32, 33, 35, 50, 51), that 
the price of $100,000 was placed upon Plaintiffs' interest 
in the M & H claims at the very first meeting of Plaintiffs 
and defendant Moreton, in the Spring of 1946, at a time when 
the parties, according to Defendants, we·re de~aling· '' a,t 
arms' length'' and that, therefore, this price was not in-
fluenced by the existence of any confidential relationship 
of attorney and client or principal and agent, and cannot 
be upset because at some· later date such a confidential 
relationship may have be.en created (Dfts. Br. 40). This 
again, of course, is in the· te.e!th of the Reeord. 
Rex Holland testified that the option drawn in More<ton 's 
own hand at the very firs.t meeting in the Spring of 1946, was 
left blank in two important res.pects: No time was fixed 
for its exe.rcise, and no price was fixed (R. 333 to 337). 
Rex pointed out as to the price, that it was left blank he-
cause, as Moreton explained to them when Moreton in his 
own hand wrote out this ''lost'' option of April 1946, ''he 
5 Defendants' misstatement in this respect is, of course gratuitous 
and, actually, of no legal significance. Since none of the options 
given, including those given prior to March of 1947, were ever exer-
cised, ·either by April 1947 or thereafter (R. 628, 664-665, 682-683), 
it makes little difference whether or not the Attorney-Client relation-
ship was entered into in April 1946 or March 1947, because in either 
event it existed on the critical date of December 20, 1948 when 
Plaintiffs-as the result of Defendants' fraud-were induced to part 
with their property and suffer their damage. 
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(Moreton) did not know at that time just what value this 
property had'' (R. 337). In fact, according to Rex (R. 
341-346) no price was fixed or eve-n mentioned un.til a mee~t­
ing which Rex de-finitely identified as occurring on March 
10, 1947 because the power of attorney (P. Ex. 8) which 
Moreton got the Plaintiff:s to give him at the same time was 
dated March 10, 194 7 ( R. 345). It was at that March 1947 
meeting, Rex sai.d, that price was first discussed and that 
Moreton told them that, because of the overburden, the most 
they could get was ten cents a ton; on which basis, an overall 
price of $133,000 was fixed-$33,000 for Moreton's 14 in-
terest and $100,000 for the other% (R. 343-344). 
Aside from Moreton's testimony (R. 623-625) about the 
price being contained in the ''lost'' option, 6 all other evi-
dence and testimony of every witness including Moreton 
confirms and supports Rex's testimony that the, price was 
not contained in the original option for the reason that 
no one in the Sp,ring of 1946 knew the value of the prop-
6 The record thoroughly justifies the suspicion that this "lost'' 
option was really not lost. It justifies the suspicion that Moreton 
must have seen this document at least shortly before his deposition. 
Thus, while Moreton claims never to have seen the document since 
it was originally drawn (R. 615) he was, nevertheless, years later 
both at his deposition and at the trial, able to fix the date of it and 
of his first meeting with Plaintiffs as being April 6, 1946 (R. 610, 
lines 14-17; R. 620, lines 18-30) He attempted to explain this feat 
of memory by reason of a reference he claimed was contained in 
the option of September 1. 1946, Ex. P. 4 (R. 620-621). But even 
this explanation was exposed at the trial when l\Ioreton's own chief 
counsel (apparently una·ware of the real significance of ·what he was 
doing) took up some four pages of the Record in pointing out thart 
the option of September 1. 1946, produced and put in evidence at 
the trial, contains no reference to the .L~pril 6th date or to any other 
date of any earlier meeting or document. option or otherwise (R. 
615 .. 619). 
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erty. No document was produced at the trial or at any 
deposition dated any earlie:r than July 194 7 in which the 
price $100,000 appears. Thus the option of Seiptember 1, 
1946 does not re.fe,r to the $100,000 figure. or to any figure 
at all ( R. 657, 662) and Moreton himself testified that the 
price or value of the prope:rty warS not discusse~d in his 
second meeting with Plaintiffs in September 1946 ''because 
nobody knew. They didn't know. I didn't know" the 
value ( R. 669). And Moreton repeatedly tHstified that he 
did not know what the value of the prope~rty was in 1946 and 
1947 and even up to October, 1948 (R. 601, 603, 652, 656, 
666-667' 669). 
It is true that at the: trial Moreton did at first attempt 
to contradict Rex's testimony that the price was first :fixe;d 
in March, 1947 (R. 665 line 27 toR. 666 line- 4), but, when 
confronted with his own deposition Moreton broke down and 
admitted that the price or value of the M &!i H prop~erty 
'Was 1nentioned and discussed for the first time in Ma.rch of 
1947 ( R. 666 line 5 to R. 668 line 27). 
(d) 
Defendants in their brief, of course, cite no authorities 
as to how the relationship of Attorney-Client is created. 
They merely announce it did not exist in this case. The 
general statements of the law from Corpus Juris Secundum 
quoted above, make it clear Defendants are wrong. How-
ever, since Defendants have raised such a fundamental 
question, we list belo\v for the convenience of the Court, 
additional authorities showing that, upon such circmn-
stances as those undisputed on the Record in this case, the 
relationship of attorney and client certainly did e·xist; and 
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particularly, that it did exist both in July 1947 when Plain-
tiffs gave Moreton a deed to a 1;4 interest (R. 691, 69·2) 
(which even Moreton, upon being confronted with his depo-
sition (R. 701) was forced to admit (R. 702) he had not 
earned) and on the critical date, December 20, 1948, when 
Plaintiffs sold the rest of their property. 
In Keenan v. Scott, Sup. Ct. W.Va., 1908, 61 S. E. 806, 
plaintiff claime,d he had employed Scott & Cobb to be his 
attorneys in litig~ation involving some land, the title to 
which those attorneys acquired in their own name subse-
quent to the alleged employment. 
In reversing a decree for the defendants, the Supreme 
Court of West Virginia began by saying it would ''inquire 
as to when -did this professional relation commence". It 
then quoted from Weeks on Attorneys, Section 183, as fol-
lows: 
''An attorney may be employed \Yithout formalities 
of any kind. The contract 1nay be made by parole 
and is often largely i1nplied from the acts of the 
parties.'' 
Following that and the citation of other authorities, the 
Court announced (l. c. 809) that: 
·'These authorities and n1any others "·hich might be 
cited, are conclusi ce of the p14 opos·ition that, as soon 
as the client has e.rprcssed a desire to employ wn 
attot~ney an,rl thet·e has been a cot·"fespo1tding con.serd 
on the part of the attorney to act fot~ hi.Jn in a pro-
fessional capacity, the -relation of attorney and client 
has been established aud that all dealings thereafter 
bettveen. the1n relating to the subject of employment 
tvill be govet·ned by the rules applicable to such rela-
tion.'' 
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In its opinion the Supreme Court of West Virginia cited 
the case of Eo If v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 378, 18 S. W. 907, in 
·which the Supreme Court of .NiiRsouri, in reversing- the 
Court below, held that the Attorney-Client relationship 
existed as a matter of law on the basis of the following' 
stated facts: 
"It appears that the plaintiff and a JYir. Ste~vens (a 
retired lawyer) \Vere neighbors * ,x. :r.· plaintiff g-ave 
Stevens the abstract of title oX• '~ * but Stevens be~ing 
out of the practice, advised plaintiff to employ Blair 
& Irvine. The plaintiff did not know these attorneys, 
and he requHsted Stevens to take it (the abstract of 
title) to them for examination. The evidence of 
Stevens is that he left the abstract at the office of 
the attorneys on a table but he does not know whether 
either of them was present 'YF '" *. In a short time 
plaintiff received a note from Irvine (who in the 
meantime had, through straws, acquired certain 
rights to the property) asking whether he \Vould pay 
$1,000 for a quit claim deed, \vith the reque·st to eall. 
He says he called at the office of these attorneys and 
Irvine pointed out the defects in the title~ and advised 
him to procure a deed from the· owne~rs * * *. The 
plaintiff paid the attorneys nothing for their serv-
ices and they made no demand upon him for compen-
sation * * * " 
As to such facts, the Supreme Court of Missouri de-
clared: 
"This evidence as a whole shows beyond doubt that 
Stevens did eJnploy these attorneys arnd that they 
examined the abstract pursuant to that employn~ent. 
The relation of attorney and client, therefore, diil 
exist * 'x: * . ' ' 
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In Healy v. Gray, Sup. Ct. Io,va 1918, 168 N. W. 2:22, the 
plaintiff, 'Yhose father had just died, met the defendant, 
an attorney, in the street, and in an informal conversation 
asked that the defendant procure plaintiff's appointment 
as administrator of his father's estate. Subsequent there-
to the defendant's law firm (unbeknownst to plaintiff) ac-
quired title to certain valuable land which, plaintiff claimed, 
properly should have been acquired by the estate. D·efend-
ants made the familiar conte·ntion that they thought plaintiff 
wanted them to have this land. The Supreme Court of 
Iowa said: 
''The decision of this case turns upon the question 
whether the relation of attorney and client existed 
between the parties hereto * * * at the time Appel.-
lants purchased the land * * * the employment of Ap-
pellants by Frank Healy to procure his appointment 
as administrator is conceded by ..._~ppellants, but they 
seek to limit the scope thereof to that purpose only 
* * * 
''While the relation of attorney and client rests upon 
contract, it is not necessary that any particular for-
mali ties be observed in relation thereto, or that a 
retainer be demanded or paid. The contract may be 
implie·d from the conduct of the parties * * *. 
'' * * * no definite course of procedure 'vas consid-
ered or discussed. except .. A. ppellant 's claim that 
Frank said it "~as all right for them to buy the land. 
That the rela.tion of attorney and client existed be-
tween Frank Healy as ad Jn in i stra tor a nil Appellants 
at the tin1e iu questio,n adnl'ifs of no controversy 
* * * 
'' * * * Frank Healy believed and understood tha~ 
when hP gave the letter to R. C. Gray, the firm was 
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acting for hirn in all rnatters pertaining to the estate 
of his father. If Appellants desired a more definite 
~tnderstanding, or contract, rts to the extent arnd scope 
of their er1nploy Jne,nf, they should have so informed 
Healy." 
This Court has held t.ha~t an Attorney-Client relation-
ship exists whenever one undertakes to draft and prepare 
legal documents for another, notwithstanding that the party 
drafting the documents is not even a lawyer admitted to 
practice at the time. Thus in Malia v. Giles, 100 Utah, 562, 
114 P. 2d, 208, 212, this Court said: 
"The practice of law includes the preparation of 
legal instruments and contracts by which legal 
rights are secured. 7 C. J. S. Attorney & Client, 
p. 704, Sec. 3g and Note 30. The preparation of the 
deed, the note and the n~ortgage ~vas the practice of 
lau;. This was done by Mr. Stanley for Mr. Baird 
at a time vvhen the former \Yas not admitted to pra.c-
tice to the Bar of this State. It 'Was the practice of 
law nevertheless, and Mr. Stanley tvas Mr. Baird's 
attorney in perforn~ing these services. * * * There-
fore, his method of attaching and selling the note to 
other clients of his O\vn \Vas flying right in the teeth 
of his duties to Mr. Baird. It was conduct that public 
policy will not tolerate.'' 
Additionally, this Court, later in the same opinion gave 
a complete answer to Defendants' contention (which we dis-
cuss in more detail in our next point) that an employment 
agreement is any kind of defense to fraud and that a dis-
honest practitioner can successfuHy, and without liability, 
practice fraud on his clients by cunningly arranging and 
scheduling the manner, method, timing and sequence of 
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the events whereby he is retained and by including the 
means of accomplishing his fraud in the very agreement 
by which he is employed. Such a thing, this Court an-
nounced in no uncertain terms, would never be counte-
nanced, saying: 
u Mr. Baird's defense based upon this conflict of 
interest in Mr. Stanley as an attorney, is well takern.. 
To permit an attorney to so deal with his clients' 
property would countenance a fraud upon the client. 
•A< * * That the client may ultimately win the case 
makes the transaction none the less reprehensible. 
We have already fro\vned upon the conduct of an 
attorney 'vhose interests are conflicting. Gillette v. 
Newhouse Realty Co., 75 Utah 13, 228 P. 776, 779, 
held ' * * * An attorney ntay not by a contract of 
employ1nent with his client~ place hin~self in a posi-
tion where his own interests are in conflict with 
those of his client. The relation of an attorney and 
client is one of trust and confidence requiring the 
attorney to use all care, skill and diligence at his 
command to serve his client alone * * * and without 
any temptation to serve his own interests at the 
expense of his client. The rule th-at an attorney may 
not by his contra-ct of employJnenf place lzintSelf in 
a position. ·z.vhere h-is ozcu interest or the interests of 
another ttvhorn he repTesents cot~tfiict zoi.tll the in-
terests of his client. is founded upon principles of 
public policy. It is designed to serfe various pur-
poses, anz.ong then1 to prerent the dishonest practi-
tioner fro1n fraudule·nt co-nduct * * * to further the 
orderly a.dn1inistra tion .of justice and to foster re-
spect for the profession and the court * * *. The 
attachment in this casl~ is raid as again-st public 
policy. ¥:< * ;'{: reversed, and judgJne·nt of no cause of 
actio~n entered in fa tor of the Bairds." 
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See also Lucas v. Smith, Sup. Ct. Cal., 1956, 300 P·. 2d 
828, 830. 
(e) 
Defendants cite no authority for their contention that 
the Attorney-Client relationship did not exist in this case 
nor do they cite any authority -vvhich in any way excuses 
Defendant Moreton's reprehensible conduct. Instead they 
cite certain case~s in support of the irrelevant proposition by 
which Moreton seeks to e·scape liability for his fraud, nam.ely 
that an attorney at the time he accepts an employment 
agreement from his client is entitled to drive the be1st bar-
gain he can; and that once the retaine·r agreement is made, 
the client cannot therafter upset the agreHment merely 
because the other party to it was an attorney. 
No one of course disputes the validity of this proposi-
tion; however it is not at all applicable to this case. Addi-
tionally, as Defendants' own authorities reveal on their face 
it has its limits. Thus the statement of the general rule ap-
pearing in American Jurisprudence quoted by Defendants 
(Dfts. Br. 35) expressly states that while employment con-
tracts between an attorney and client "are not within the 
rule of pre·sumption against the attorney,'' they will be up-
held and enforced only •' if'' they are ''fair and reason-
able'' and do not ''for other reasons contravene public 
policy." Of. Malia v. Giles, supra, from which WH have just 
quoted and Newhouse v. Gillette, 75 Utah 13, 228 P. 776, 
779 cited and quoted therein. 
This same limitation appears either expressly or by 
clear implication in at least two of the six cases cited by 
Defendants under their Point I (which are the only two of 
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the six in which an attorney's employment contract was 
involved). Thus Swanson v. Hempstead, 149 P. 2d 404 
(Dfts. Br. 40) held merely that a 50o/a contingent fee con-
tract was not, as a matter of law, "unconscionab1e;'' and in 
Hansel v. Norblad, 151 P. 962 (Dfts. Br. 35), the court, after 
pointing out that "no false prete·nce or any act of fraud is 
alleged'' state~d only (l.c. 966) that: 
'' ,x: * * we are not prepared to say from the testi-
mony that the fee charged for defending a man 
for murder in the first degree is so excessive as to 
impute fraud to the attorneys.'' 
In Lindsay v. Marcus, 325 P. 2d 267 (Dfts. Br. 36) the 
defendant (Lindsay, a layman) took prope-rty in his own 
name and then repudiated a joint venture agreement for the 
acquisition of that property previously entered into between 
himself and two others, one o.f whom happened to be an 
attorney who had in other matters sometimes performed 
leg·al services for Lindsay. No fraud, concealment, mis-
representation, deception or false pretense of any kind 
was shown on the part of the attorney. :\Ioreover as the 
court itself pointed out ( l.c. 272) the .Attorney-Client 
relations~hip was not involved. 
In Goodson v. Smith, 243 P. 2d 163 (Dfts. Br. 33) the 
attorne~y was not even a party to the contract in dispute. 
The contract referred to in the exce~rpt from that case which 
Defendants quote (Dfts. Br. 33-34) \Yas not, as Defendants 
\vould make it appear, a contract \Vith the attorney at all, 
but a contract for the sale of oil a11d mineral rights entered 
into between the plaintiff and the principal defendant 
in that case, a man named Christy. The attorney's only 
connection \\rith thi~ contract \Vas that he had drafted it at 
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the insistence of the plaintiff; and as the court pointed out 
11 there is no indication whatever that the (attorney) had 
any motive for draw·ing any instru·1nents which did not con-
tain the wishes she expressed to him.'' A far cry from the 
facts in the Record before this Court. 
In re Blodget's Estate, 93 Utah 1, 7 P. 2d 742 (Dfts. Br. 
39) is of cours~e no help at all to Moreton; on the contrary, 
the very langUJage of this Court which defendants quote 
(Dfts. Br. 39-40) is sufficient to convict him. Thus, as this 
Court there pointed out, the fiduciary-administrator had a 
duty to: 
'' :r:• ,x. * disclose all estate property and all infor·m.a-
tion to those interested in the estate as to estate 
matters, thus ptttting the1n on the same. plane as he 
was as to such information regarding all the assets 
and transactions.'' 
But the Record in this case is overwhelming-Hven to 
the inclusion of an express and unequivocal confession from 
the fiduciary-attorney/agent, himself-that the fiduciary 
now before this Court did not disclose all information as to 
all transactions and that he did not put the Plaintiffs on an 
even plane with himself ( R. 832 lines 2'4-30). 
Moore v. Hoar, 81 P. 2d 226 (Dfts. Br. 37) did not even 
involve an attorney/client dispute of any kind. In fa.ct on 
analysis it involveis only a dispute between two objects 
of a dead man's bounty; one, an attorney who was given 
an assignment of an interest in some unpatented mining 
claims while the man was still living and the othe·r, the 
beneficiary under the de:ad man's will. 
No false pretense or concealment or fraud of any kind 
were, it appears, even charged to have been committed by 
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the attorney. Instead, it was only charged (in order to get 
the benefit of the presumption of invalidity of contracts 
between attorneys and their clients) that an Attorney-Client 
relationship existed at the time of the assignment. How-
ever, it was found as a fact at the trial (conducted without 
a jury) that the relationship of attorney and client did not 
exist at such time and the California District Court o.f Ap-
pe~als (while describing the testimony as to the absence of 
any Attorney-Client relationship as ''far from satisfac-
tory") said that, neverthless it "must be conceded" that 
the Trier of the Fact (who had had the opportunity to ob-
serve the demeanor and appearance of the witnesses on the 
stand), "was entitled'' to make such a finding and (I.e. 
237): 
"It may not, therefore, be declared, as appellants 
contend, that the finding negativing the existence of 
the fiduciary relationship on the date mentioned is 
so lacking in evidentiary support that it must be set 
aside.'' 
Thus, on analysis the decision in Moore v. Hoar, which 
Defendants cite is really authority for Plaintiffs' propo-
sition (urged in our next Point II), that the existence or 
non-existence of an Attorney-Client relationship .Zs a ques-
tion of fact and is, therefore, for the determi-nation of a 
jury when one is demanded as ,it was in the carSe at bar. 
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II. 
Replying to Defendants' Conte·ntion That the 
Existence of the Confidential Relationship 
Was a Matter f·or the Court and Not the Jury 
(Dfts. Br. Point I) 
(a) 
D.efendants state on page 34 of their brief that "the 
authorities are abundant without dissent that it is the duty 
of the court to determine as a legal matter the question 
of the interpretation of the instruments before it''. Pre-
ceding that they state on pages 27 and 28 that ''if any 
such relationship of attorney and client vvas created, it 
·would necessarily have to arise from the interpretation 
and construction of the option, which we submit is impos-
sible' '.7 
The ''option'' they are talking about is, of course, the 
''lost" option of April 6, 1946 and we agree with them 
that it was "impossible" for the trial court to have inte,r-
preted that option. It was rendered "imposstble-" because 
the Defendant Moreton who drew the option and was the 
7 In this connection D·efendants burden their Brief with what ap-
pears to be another misstatement. Thus on page 28 they state "We 
agree with plaintiff's Point I to the effect that the relationship between 
the parties was a matter of law for the Court to detennine." This 
of course represents a completely erroneous description of Plaintiffs' 
position. Point I of Plaintiffs' Brief recognizes that tfue existence 
of the confidential relationship is a matter of fact to be determined 
by the jury; but, we pointed out that, on the Record in this case, the 
evidence ·establishing the existence of the fiduciary relationship was so 
undisputed and one-sided, that the Court could properly have taken 
the issue ·away from the jury and decided it as a matter of law. 
(Pl. Br. 20-24) 
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only person who ever had a copy of that option, failed to 
produce it at any time during the course of this litigation 
either during his deposition or any of the other depositions 
or at the trial (R. 622) and, further, failed to give any ex-
planation as to how or why this document, of all docurnents 
involved, happens to be the one he did not produce. 
Obviously a defendant's supp-ression of documentary 
eviden·ce can never be the basis for escaping liability which 
the documents, had they been produced, would impose. In 
fact, there is a presumption operating against a party, 
known to have had evidence in its possession bearing upon 
an issue, which such party without any plausible explana-
tion (in fact in this case without any explanation at all) 
fails to produce. The presumption is that the evidence if 
produced would have been unfavorable to the contention of 
such party. Thus on this state of the Record, Moreton's 
failure to produce the ''lost'' option agreement of the 
spring of 1946 brings into play against Moreton the pre-
sumption that had this "lost" option been produced it 
would have established the existence of the Attorney-Client 
relationship as of the date it bore, ''Thich date Moreton 
himself has fixed as being April 6, 1946. In such a situation 
it cannot be maintained as Defendant contends that the 
trial court had any basis for directing a verdict for the 
Defendant Moreton because the Attorney--Client relation-
ship had not been established. 
Moreover even giving Defendant l\loreton the benefit of 
every doubt, even assuming that his failure to produce the 
''lost'' option '"as excusable and that the presumption 
should not be employed against hi1n, the Trial Court was 
still not justified ~in directing a ve'rdict on the ba.sis of this 
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issue because it is the unani1nous holding of all courts that 
whenever the creation, existence, contin;uation, repudiation, 
terrnination or abandonment of a confidential relationship, 
including the relationship of Attorney-C'lient, is in dispute 
it is a question of fact to be determined by a jury whenever, 
as in this case, a trial by jury has been de:manded. 
(b) 
For the convenience of the Court we have collected 
below some cases which illustrate the unanimity of all 
courts on this point. 
In Pettine v. A.rster, 136 Atl. 8: the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island stated : 
''Plaintiff testified that defendant aske:d him to try 
the case. Defendant denied this statement * .x· ..:· this 
conflicting testimony required submission of the 
issue to the jury." 
In Bonelli v. Conrad, 1 C. A. 2nd 660, 37 P. 2d 137, 141, 
the California District Court of Appeals held: 
''The court did not err in refusing to instruct the 
jury that the undisputed evidence showed that the 
contract in question was enteTed into while the rela-
tionship of attorney and client existed. This was a 
question of fact in issue before the jury, and the 
court properly refrained from invading its peculia.r 
province.'' 
In this case Rex Holland's testimony as to the conversa-
tion between Plaintiffs and Moreton in the spring of 19'46, 
·when they accepted Moreton's offer to act as their attor-
ney, was, as previously indicated, undenied by Defendant 
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Moreton. Thus this is a much stronger case on its facts 
than Graeser v. Jones, 2!51 N. W. 16·2, in which, as to the 
Attorney-Client employnH~nt contract, the Supreme Court 
of Iowa stated: 
''Appellant predicates error on the action of the 
trial court in submitting the case to the· jury, claim-
ing that there was not sufficient evidence that a con-
tract was entered into, as alleged, to warrant the 
submission of the question to the jury. Plaintiff 
testified to the conuersation with Jones, in which it 
is claimed the agreentent was made. He testified to 
every fact necessary to create a contract. The de-
fendant denied essential1Jortion-s of the conversation 
as related by plaintiff·. This conflict in the testimony 
did not destroy plaintiff's testi-rnony. It was a ques-
tion for the jury to say zDhether they ~vould believe 
plaintiff or defen-dant. It follows that the court 
properly submitted the court to the jury." 
In Kreatz v. J.VlcDonald, 143 N. \V. 975, 976, the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota similarly held that: 
u Whether or not plaiu.tifj' enzployed defendant to 
foreclose the lien teas_, no doubt, a question for the 
jury.'' 
It has been held error for a court to direct a verdict 
on the waiver or abando1nnent of an alleged relationship 
of Attorney-Client. Thus the Supreme Court of West Vir-
ginia in Buckhann-on Bauk v. 0 'Brien d: Hall. 180 S. E. 258, 
260, reversed the trial court for directing a verdict in such 
a situation saying: 
''So, as \Ve ~ee it. the eorrectness of the court's 
action depends on \Y1IPther there "~as sufficient evi-
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deuce of a \Vaiver or abandonment of the alleged 
relationship between the Bank and defendants to 
have gone to the jury * ,x. *. 
We are of the opinion that under the circun1stances 
the case should have been permitted to go to the 
jury tmder proper instructions.'' 
Similarly, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Jinks v. 
M oppin., 80 S. vV. 390, 3.9'3, held it was error to take the issue 
of continuance of the confidential relationship of Attorney-
Client a-\vay from the jury so long as there was some evi-
dence showing its continuance. The court stated: 
"If it can be said that some evidence was adduced 
tending to show the continuance of the rela.tion, the 
question should have been left to the ju,ry." 
To like effect is the holding of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina in Francis v. Mortgage Security Corp. of 
.America, 153 S. E. 317, 318, where the court said: 
''There wa.s a direct conflict in the evidence as to 
whether the plaintiff "\Vas employed >r.: * * and the 
issue necessarily called for a determination of this 
question. Hence it was error to direct a verdict 
thereon.'' 
Even the question of whether a certain writing' should 
be regarded as an attorney's employment contract has been 
held to be one for the jury. Thus the Supreme Court of 
Kansas in Austin v. Prudential Trust Company, 112 Kan. 
545, 212 P. 77, 80, said : 
" * * * The question of whether it (the writing) 
should be * * * regarded as an employment of the 
. plaintiff by the trustee to prose·cute such action as 
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his attorney \vas one to be determined by the triers 
of fact.'' 
In Gillis v. Paddocks Estate, 109 N. W. 734, the Trial 
C'ourt at the close of the trial directed a verdict for the 
defendant. The Supreme Court of Nebraska after point-
ing out that there was conflicting testimony reversed, say-
Ing: 
" ,x. * * Under that set of facts the case should have 
been submitted to the jury, with proper instructions, 
to determine when the contract of eniployment was 
in fact made * * *. '' 
T'he Supreme Court of Oreg·on has held it is not' error 
for a trial court to overrule defendant's motion for a 
non-suit and refuse to direct a verdict in favor of the de-
fendants as to the issue of the existence or non-existence 
of an attorney-client relationship. S.o long· as there was 
some evidence tending to support the claim of one of the 
parties on this point, the sufficiency of that evidence, the 
court pointed out, was a matter to be determined by the 
jury and not by the judge at the trial. Thus in Currey v. 
Butcher, 37 Ore. 61 P. 631, 634, the court stated: 
''This motion \YaB based upon the contention that 
there was no proof that the defendants were actu-
ally employed by the plaintiff to examine the title 
to the land referred to, or that the relation of attor-
ney and client existed bet\Yee-n then1. It is sufficient 
to say that an Pxan1ination of the record discloses 
that there leas son1c eridence tendi,ng to supp-ort the 
J>la,intiff's tlain1 upon this point. Its snfficiency was 
for the .fury, and uot the court.,'' 
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III. 
Replying to Defendants' Contentions That the 
Parties Were Engaged in a Mining P'artner-
ship and That as a Co-Tenant Moreton Had No 
Duty to Disclose (Dfts. Br. Point II) 
(a) 
Upon the citation and quotation of excerpts from au-
thorities on l\'Iining Law, and cases involving mining part-
nerships, Defendants se:ek to create the erroneous impres-
sion that Plaintiffs and Moreton either were engaged in a 
mining partnership or that their only relation with each 
other was that of co-tenants (Dfts. Br. 43-47). 
This co-tenancy came about, D,efendants misleadingly 
relate, when Plaintiff's ''sought Mr. Moreton out as· a 
prospective purchaser for the claims" (Dfts. Br. 42) and 
upon this ''ground alone'', they erroneously contend, the 
trial court would have been justified in granting the judg-
me'llt notwithstanding the verdict (Dfts. Br. 42). 
The Record, of course, does not bear out Defendants' 
version that Plaintiffs sought out Moreton, although More-
ton tried hard to make it appear that way at the trial. Thus 
Moreton testified that on the original meeting in the Spring 
of 1946, Plaintiffs "came to me" (R. 609). But he was 
almost immediately forced to concede that neither Rex 
Holland nor his father John ever said anything to indicate 
that they had sent for MoTeton to come down to Cedar 
City (R. 610), and furthe~r admitted that the night before 
he ever saw the Plaintiffs, he (Moreton) together with 
Murie-whom ~1oreton was paying at least up to the time 
of the trial (R. 448)-had actually g·one out and examined 
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theM & H properties (R. 633, 799-800). Likewise More~ton's 
attempt to explain the open map he had laid out showing 
the JYI & H properties when Plaintiffs first walked into his 
(Moreton's) hotel room (R. 332-333), on the ground that "I 
brought it :r.c * * (the map) in connection with my own 
claim~s" (R. 610-611) is contradicted by the fact that More-
ton's own claims were, as he himself said, ''about twelve 
miles west, clear across the desert and on the other side 
of the mountain'' from the ~I & H claims (R. 5,S7). 
And, finally Moreton's testimony that on September 1, 
1946 he stopped at the El Escalante Hotel and stayed ''there 
that night and probably the next two or three" (R. 801), 
on business ''in connection with my own properties'' was 
completely punctured by testimony from Mr. Fred Warner, 
Manager of the El Escalante Hotel, that the records of the 
hotel do not show that Moreton stayed there overnight on 
any night during the period August 24 to September 5, 1946 
(R. 843). So that, it would appear Moreton came down to 
Cedar City on September 1, 1946 for the sole purpose of 
seeing Plaintiffs and procuring their signatures to the 
second option (P. Ex. 4), dated September 1, 1946, and 
then left for Salt Lake immediately thereafter on the same 
day that he eame down.8 
8 The records of the El Escalante Hotel also contraclict Moreton-'s 
test·in~ony as to his first visit to Cedar City in the Spring of 1946. 
Moreton denied that he went do\vn to Cedar City on that trip with 
his wife; he said "I am sure I did not" (R. 800) but P. Ex. 59, one 
of the registration cards \Vhich l\Ioreton signed ·when he registered 
at the hotel in the Spring of 1946 .. sho\YS that he tnust have brought 
his wife with hitn because she was registered as sharing ~Ioreton's 
roon1 for the length of his stay (R. 841-843) \vhich began at 6:15 p. 
n1. on the evening of April 2 .. 1946 (R. 843). 
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(b) 
Thus Defendants' picture of 11:oreton as an innocent 
purchaser whom Plaintiffs badge1·ed every time he cam.e 
to Cedar City until they finally importuned him either to 
enter a mining partnership or become a co-tenant with them, 
is not at all supported by the evidence and testimony in 
the case. Additionally, even if true, it is no defense, as 
even Defendants' own authorities reveal. 
In their attempt to create the impression that there was 
a mining partnership betvveen the parties in this case, De-
fendants cite Harris v. Lloyd, 28 P. 736 (Dfts. Br. 43, 44). 
They also cite one of the cases relied on and quoted in 
Harris v. Lloyd-the case of Bissell v. F'oss, 114 U. S. 25·2, 
5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851, 2.9· L:. Ed. 12~6. But, neither of these 
cases has any pertinence to the case at bar for any pur-
pose other than to establish that whatever relationship the 
parties had, it was certainly not a mining partnership. 
In Harris v. Lloyd, certain property on whtich mining 
operations had previously been carried on, was sold, and 
one of the tenants in common owning that property, Lloyd, 
got $30,000 more than his co-tenants. For some years prior 
to the sale Lloyd and his co-tenants had also been parties 
to a mining partnership in the operation and exploitation 
of the mine but that partnership had been terminated and 
all mining operations pursuant to it had ceased at least 
two weeks before the sale. Following a trial, the jury had 
brought in a special verdict, finding that Lloyd had not 
"in any manner whatever" induced the co-tenants to sell 
their interest, and further, that Lloyd had not'' at any time 
or at all'' 1nade any false statements whereby his co-tenants 
were induced to sign the contract of sale. 
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The trial judge, who was apparently unaware of the 
difference between a mining partnership and an ordinary 
commercial partnership, held that Lloyd actually stood in 
a partnership relation with his co-tenants at the time of the 
sale, and that notwithstanding the jury's verdict that he 
did not induce the sale and that he 1nade no false statements 
''at any tim.e or at all'' to induce the sale, he \Vas, never-
theless, as a partner, liable because of his failure to dis-
close to the others that he was g·etting· $30,000 more than 
they were. 
The Supreme Court of Montana reversed, noting that 
there was no basis for any finding by the trial court of any 
kind of fraud on the part of Lloyd in vie\v of the jury's 
finding to the contrary. It pointed out that the only part-
nel}ship relation between the parties had been a mining part-
nership relation and cited Bissell v. Foss for the proposi-
tion that members to a mining partnership do not have the 
same duties as regards the sale or transfer of their interest 
in the partnership that members of an ordinary commer-
cial partnership have. It held that upon the termination 
of the mining partnership, the only relation between the 
parties was one of co-tenancy, and that under that relation 
Lloyd had no duty to disclose \Vhat he \Vas getting for the 
sale of his interest and that thus, the mere fact that he 
did not disclose to them tl1a t he \ras getting the extra 
$30,000 \vas not. sufficient to render hun liable to them for it, 
citing for that proposit,ion thl") leadil1g case of llfatthews v. 
Bliss, 2::2, Pick. 48-\Y hich, as \Ye \Yill sho'v belo\Y, conclu-
:-~ively establishes ~Iorc~ton 's liability on the R.ecord in this 
case. 
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A mere reading of Harris v. Lloyd is sufficient to estab-
lish that Defendants' suggestion that a mining partnHrship 
existed between Plaintiffs and 1\!lort•ton merits no considera-
tion. In distinguishing between mining partnerships and 
other partnerships, the court in Harris v. Lloyd cited and 
quoted not only from Bissell v. Foss, but also from the 
opinion of Mr. Justice Field in the later case of Kimberly 
A.rrns, 129 U. S. 512, 32 L. Ed. 764 which delineates 
the line between a mining partnership and an ordinary 
partnership and shows conclusively why there was no 
mining partnership in the case before this Court. Mr. 
Justice Field said ( 1. c. 770-771) : 
''The case of Bissell Y. Foss, 114 U. S. 252, 5 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 851, does not seem to us to have any bear-
ing on the subject under consideration. There the 
question was whether a member of a mining partner-
shitJ-that is, a partnership for·1ned for the develop-
rnent and working of a n~ine-could acquire the 
shares of an associate without the knowledge of the 
other associates and hold them on his own account, 
and the court held it vvas lavvful for him to do so. * * * 
The partnership between Arrns and Kin~berly was 
not a mining partnership, in the prope~r sense of 
that term. It was not a partnership for de:veloping 
and working mines, but for tlle purchase and sale of 
minerals and 1nining lands, and in that respect was 
subject to the rules governing ordinary trading or 
commercial partnerships. It can no more be called a 
·mining partnership than a partner·ship for the pur-
chase of the products of a farm and the lands upon 
which those products are raised can be called a pa.rt-
nership to farm~ lands." 
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(c) 
As. previously indicated, even if Defendants' erroneous 
contention that the only relation hetwe·en the· parties was 
one of co-tenancy, be, for the sake of argument, as,sumed, 
the error of the trial court must still be reversed, for on 
the undisputed Record in this case, and under the authority 
of Matthews v. Bliss, supra (cited, quoted and heavily relied 
upon in Harris v. Lloyd on which Defendants principally 
rely), Moreton's liability app·ears as a matter of law. 
In Mat thews v. Bliss, one of several co-owners of a ship 
sued the others, alle·ging that they had conspired to get him 
to sell his inte>re·st in the ship for a price lower than that 
which they had already arranged to receive for theh"s. The 
trial court directed a verdict for the defendants on the 
ground that since the only relationship of the parties was 
as co-owners of a ship, the defendants had no duty to dis-
close the higher price defendants vvere getting for their 
inte-rest in the ship. The Supreme Court of ~Iassachusetts, 
while conceding that this was a correct statement of the-law, 
neverthele·ss reversed, because as its opinion reveals, co-
tenants, while they have no duty to disclose, have other 
duties which if breached, rend~r them liable. The Court 
said: 
'' »:, * :y,, The Court are of the opinion, that the tenants 
in common of a vessel "'"ho are not engaged jointly 
in the employment of purchasing or building ships 
for sale, do not stand in such a relation of mutual 
trust and confidence to\vards each other, in respect 
of the sale of such vessel, that each is bound in his 
dealings "Tith the other, to con1munica.te all the infor-
Ination of fact ,\·ithiu his kno,vledge ,\·hich may effect 
the price or value. * * * but, al-iud est tacere, aUu,d 
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celare. With this advantageous kno~wledge, if there 
be studied efforts to prevent the other party coming 
to the knowledge of the tru.th or if there be any, 
though slight, false and fraud.ule:n.t suggestion or 
representation, tlz en tll e transaction is tainted with 
turpitu.de, and alike contrary to the rules of morality 
and law.'' 
Thus, the establishment of either of two elHments (pre-
venting the other parties from le~arning the. truth and any 
false or fraudulent suggestion, however "slight")-both of 
which are undisputed in the record of this case-would be 
sufficient under Matthews v. Bliss to render "the trans-
action * =K• * tainted with turpitude, and alike contrary t;o 
the rules of morality and law." 
Moreton himself admitted he prevented the plaintiff 
from ''coming to the knowledge of the truth'' when he sent 
back the single document embodying the Contract of Sale 
which Columbia, according to its usual practice ( R. 549) 
had drafted (R. 551, 770-771) and insisted that two separate 
documents he employed-one covering the sale of his one-
quarter intere·st and the othe-r covering the1 sale of his 
client's thre·e-quarter intere.st in theM & H claims (R. 771). 
Had the single contract been employed, Plaintiffs would 
of course have learned the truth as. to the ''false and fraudu-
lent suggestion or repre.sentation'' which Moreton made t:o 
them at his meeting with them in Cedar City on March 10, 
1947 when, according to Rex Holland (R. 343 to 344): 
''A. And the price at that time was mentioned. 
'' Q. Tell us what was said a:bout that subject. 
A. That price can1e from Mr. Moreton, that because 
of the depth of the ore body, because~ of the vast 
amounts of money that would have to he spent to 
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move the overburden over that ore to open pit mine 
that, that we could not expect to get more than ten 
cents a ton for the ore that was in that ore body." 
And-" A. It come from 1fr. 1\Ioreton, that he 
thought that we could get $133,000 as an overall 
price for the property. Out of this $133,000 we were 
to get $100,000 and that vv-ould leave him $33,000, 
vvhich would be equal to our individual one-fourth 
interest.'' 
Had Moreton not prevented the employment of the ori-
ginal single document, Plaintiffs would have also learned 
of Moreton's further misrepresentations in July of 1947 
when the Agreement of Ownership was signed (R. 359-365) 9 
S<et forth in Rex' testimony as follows (R. 365) : 
''The Court: All right. -nT as anything else said, 
Mr. Holland~ 
''The Witness: There \\Tas something said in 
there about-
'' ~fr. Gustin: In ''T-here~ X O"\v, just a minute. 
''The vVitness: X ot in this, no. 
''The Court: In this conversation. 
''The Witness : In this conversation about the 
thought of 1,550,000 tons at 10 cents a ton would 
not exceed $150,000.'' 
Note: This testimony was never denied. Moreton, in 
all the days he was on the stand, never denied making these 
misrepresentations in March and July, 1947. As a matter 
of fact, Moreton's own testimony substantiates and con-
firms Rex' testimony. ~I ore ton repeatedly in his testimony 
9 As the above record reference indicates, Defendants' statement 
( Dfts. Br. 31) that the record shows no tnisrepresentation when the 
.Agreetnent of Ownership was signed-is sitnply not true. 
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stated that nobody knew ''what price peT ton could be ob-
tained'' because the size of the overbn rden and whether or 
not the ore could he mined by open pit method were- critical 
factors in determining that price ( R. 600, 601, 603, 604, 645, 
669, 676, 784, 829, 830). ~loreton even admitted (after being 
confronted, of course, with his deposition) that he had 
actually quoted the Plaintiffs a price of '' 121;2¢ for under-
ground ore" (R. 831-832). 
IV. 
Replying to Defendants' Co·ntentions as to 
the Statute of Limitations (Dfts. Br. Pts. 
IV, V & VI) 
(a) 
Defendants attempt to justify the e-rror of the trial 
court on the ground that the- action was barred by the 
St·atute of Limitations and, in that connection, they an-
nounce that ''the time of discovery is a matter of law for 
the Court to determine'' ( Dfts. Br. 79). 
They cite no cases for this proposition and there are 
none: the law is entirely to the contrary. Thus in 54 C. J. S. 
Limi·tation of Actions Sec. 400 p. 5·52 it is said that: 
"Ordinarily where fraud, mistake, concealment or a 
trust relationship is relied on to take the case out 
of the operation of the statute of limitations, the. mat-
ters to be determined by the jury or trier of fact as 
questions of fact include the existence of the fraud or 
concealment or of the trust relationship, the: time 
when plaintiff first discovered the frau.d, or received 
notice of the repudiation of the trust, and whether· by 
the exercise of due diligence he could have discovered 
at an earlier date, that he had a cause of action; and 
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these matters will n.ot be decided by the court as ques-
tions of la,w." 
Numerous pronouncements of the courts are in accord; 
thus: 
Stevens v. Marco (Cal.), 305 P. 2nd 669, 684: 
''From the evidence we cannot hold as a matter of 
law that any of the circumstances known to plain-
tiff should have put a reasonably prudent peTson on 
inquiry. This is usually a question of fact. * * * 
it u;as a question for the jury to determine whether 
plaintiff's delay tv as reaso!flrable or excusable. It is 
not a question zve can decide as a matter of law O'nj 
these facts." 
Easton v. Chaffe (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1941), 113 P. 2nd 
31, 34: 
''Respondent argues that Appellant had knowledge 
of all the facts upon ''Thich he bases his cause of 
action more than three years before the complaint 
was filed. \:V-.-e think, however, that appellant's evi-
dence supported all the material allegations * * * 
and u;as therefore sufficient to take the case to the 
jury. In reaching this conclusion, ''"·e ha Ye not over-
looked respondent's contention that the court re-
jected certain letters offered by respondent for the 
purpose of proY"ing appellar1t 's knowledge of the 
facts more than three years before the action was 
brought. Assu'nliug the letters 1oere adn1,.iss·ible and 
that the.lJ hard been ad Jnitted. fll-e issue would have 
still been for the j:trry. '· 
Linebaugh v. Portland Jiortgage Co. (Sup. Ct. Ore. 
1925), 116 Ore. 1, 239 P. 296, 199: 
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''"\Vhen the alleged fraud was discovered, or whether 
reasonable dilig·ence \vas exercised by plaintiffs to 
discover same are ordinary questions of fact for the 
jury. 37 C. ,J. 1255. ::;: '':• =:·:· In the consi-deration of 
this question zDe are not 'llen.mindful of the constitu-
tional provision (Article 7, Sec. 3) ·which precludes 
'US fro?n invading the province of the jury, and will 
therefore not be concerned with 1natters u.pon which 
the evidence is conflicting.'' 
Birmingham Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Lovell, 5th Cir., 
1936, 81 Fed. 2nd 5HO, 593 : 
''Suit was filed within one year after the date upon 
vvhich Lovell testified he had discovered the fraud. 
Under the provisions of th~ *;, * *'' Alabama Code, 
the statute did not begin to run until the fraud was 
discovered. It tvas clearly the province of the jury 
to resolve the conflict in the evidence and to deter-
?nine 'Whether, on all the evidence the statute of lim-
itations created a bar to the sui.t. '' 
Schillner v. H. Vaughan, 2nd Cir., 1943, 134 Fed. 2nd 
875, 878-879: 
''The appellants contended that in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence the discovery should have been 
made before July 25, 1938 and so the action was 
barred * * * the issue of reasonable diligence wa.s 
properly submitted to the jury. Its verdict is con,.. 
clusive." 
(b) 
Defendants further argue on the 1ssue of Limitations 
that Plaintiffs were charged with knowledge of what \Vas 
contained in the recorded deed. They ignore and make no 
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effort to distinguish the cases cited in our original brief to 
the effect that the recording· acts will not be employed to 
aid in the accomplishment of a fraud (Pl. Br. 55) and that 
the constructive notice rule does not apply where the 
existence of a fiduciary or confiden tia). r:ela.tionship is 
shown (Pl. Br. 56). 
They themselves cite 110 cases involving a fiduciary rela-
tionship; moreover such cases as they do cite either support 
Plaintiffs' position or are distinguishable for an additional 
reason over and above those given in our original brief 
(Pl. Br. 55-57) ; this appears from the following in 54 
C. J. S. Limitation of Actions, Sec. 189b, p. 194: 
''The record of a conveyance is notice only to those 
'vho are bound to search for it, and in this behalf 
it has been said that the record of a deed or other 
instrument is constructiYe notice only to those ac-
quiring the interests subsequent to the e·xecution 
thereof; and the recording of a deed 'vhich fraudu-
lently included more land than ''as intffilded to be 
conveyed is not notice to the grantor of a fraud 
:)(<: * * " . 
In Davis v. ll!I on roe, 41 Atl. 444, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in reversing a judgment for plaintiffs said: 
''But as to any land not intended to be granted, and 
only included in the deed through fraud, defendant 
continued to hold his former title and the Statute of 
Lin1itations did not run ng-ain8t hin1 lUltil discovery~ 
or such notice as to put him on inquiry. The learned 
Judge \Vas of the opinion that the recording of the 
deed \Yas constructiYe notice to appellant of the ex-
tant of Cobb '8 clai1n under it, and that after twenty-
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one years, appellant could not be held to dispute his 
grant. In this he gave too broad an effect to the 
notice employed by the reeordiug acts. The record 
is only notice to those ~oho are bound to search for it, 
including parties subsequently dealing with the land, 
or concerned vvith its title •:.< 'x< ~: but, in general, ante-
cedent rights are not affected. The re:cording of a 
deed is the act of the grantee, and in his interest. 
He may or rr&ay not put it on ~record for yea.rs or at 
all. The grantor is under no obligation to see to its 
recording or to examine the tern~s thereof. Conse-
que;ntly it is no notice to him.'' 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Stocklassa v. Kinna-
mon, 269 Pac. 1080, 1081-1082, S·aid: 
" ·x: * '~ It is next contended that the recording of 
the deed constituted constructive notice such as to 
set the Statute of Limitations in motion * * *. In 
the case of Webb, et al. v. Logan, e.t a.Z., 48 Okla. 354; 
150 Pac. 2d, 116 :r.: * * the Court said: 'To hold tha.t 
the recording of deeds of this character would he 
constructive notice to the grantor and sta.rt the 
Statute of Limitations would work a great injustice 
in this state, and to our minds, would put a premium 
on dishonesty and rascality. •X< * >'/.< ' The doctrine 
announced in this case, \Ve think is sound, and should, 
at least in principle, control this que·stion in the 
instant case. No duty rests upon the grantor to 
examine the records with reference to the title~ of 
the land after it vvas purchased and hence the public 
record thereof is not such constructive notice as will 
set the Statute of Limitations in motion.'' 
I.· In Wagner v. Wagner, 38 N. W. 2d 609, 610, the Supreme 
1 ~. Court of Iowa said: 
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''It appears they (certain instruments) were filed 
for record in 1936. The question here is whether 
this gave plaintiffs constructive notice of the con-
tents of the instruments so as to start the running 
of the Statute of Limiations at that time. We hold 
it did not. * * * It is not the purpose of the recording 
act to charge the parties with constructive notice of 
the precise contents of the instruments they execute 
but to notify subsequent purchasers and encum.-
brancers of the rights such instruments are intended 
to secure. Therefore it cannot be said that the action 
was not commenced within the time limit of the 
Statute.'' 
(c) 
Defendants' authorities do not contradict the foregoing; 
in fact those that ~are at all relevant to the issue suppo.rt 
Plaintiffs' position. For instance, Smith v. Edwards, 81 
Utah 244, 17 P. 2d 264 (Dfts. Br. 64, 65, 66, 68), on which 
Defendants so heavily rely, plainly establishes only that 
this Court (in accord with other courts) does not view that 
the reco~ding of deeds is, of itself, sufficient notice to set 
the Statute of Limitations in motion where fraud is charged. 
In that case defendants' creditors moved to set aside as 
fraudulent defendants' conveyance of certan1 tracts to his 
sons. The conveyances had been made and duly recorded 
on or before the end of 1920, but the action was not com-
menced until1927. Thus if nz.ere recording zoa-s sufficient to 
start the statute~ the actio·n 'ltas clearly bart"ed and no dis-
cussion of any other evidence Leas necessary on the issue 
of limitations. Since, on those facts this Court, neverthe'" 
less did discuss the evidence it is plain that 1nere recording 
was not deemed to be enough. And an~~ question as to this 
is resolved by the citation in Bn~ith Y. Edwa'rds of Chinn v. 
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Curtis, 71 S. W. 923; Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn. 113; 72 
N. W. 838. 
In Chinn v. Curtis, the Sup1·0me Court of Kentucky 
(affirming a ruling below that the action was not ba;rred by 
limitations) said (1. c. 924): 
'' * * * the recording * * * throws little light on 
the question of discovery. It is ad1nissible evidence 
on that question; and when the manner of its execu-
tion and registration, and other facts and circum-
stances in the case, would be sufficient to put a 
person on Inquiry, the law declares this to be 
notice. * * * " 
And in the Duxbury case (which Defendants also cite 
on page 66 of their brief) the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
said (1 c. 839): 
'' * * * the question is what constitutes a 'dis-
covery' within the meaning of the statute~ Mere 
constructive notice of the deed by reason of its being 
filed for record, is not notice of the facts constituting 
the fraud. '' 
Neither S,Jnith v. Edwards nor Chinn v. Curtis nor Dux-
bury v. Boice involve a fiduciary relation. Nor did Taylor 
v. Moore, 51 Pac. 2d 222 (Dfts. Br. 59), which further did 
not even involve a statute of limitation defe·nse but was 
only an action for rescission in which this Court expressly 
said that while plaintiffs may have waived the .right to 
rescind ''they must be left to every remedy at law for 
damages." No fiduciary relation was involved in Gibson v. 
Jensen, 15 Pac. 426 (Dfts. Br. 59, 84). Moreover, "the evi-
dence of fraud" there was not" strong'', and it was' 'undis-
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puted that plaintiff was fully advised of the fraud practised 
upon her * * * in a letter from Mr. Healey to her in which 
he made a full statement respecting his faults in the trans-
action.'' Such a decision of course is no help to Moreton 
who confessed at the trial that he never disclosed ''his 
faults in the transaction" (R. 832). Similarly in LeVine v. 
Whitehouse, 109 Pac. 2d (Dfts. Br. 80), there was no fiduci-
ary relation and the plaintiff himself testified (l. c. 6) that 
he discovered the fraud within a month after it was prac-
tis:ed. 
And in Ferrell v. Wiswell, 143 Pa.c. 582 (Dfts. Br. 60) 
not only was there no fiduciary relation but according to 
the statement of the court the evidence was overwhelming 
that ''there was no deceit, fraud or misrepresentation of 
any kind practised upon the appellant''. The trial court 
did not make and on the Record could not have made any 
such statement in this case. 
Nor is Bonded Adjustment Co-1npany v. Anderson, 57 
Pac. 2d 1046 ( Dfts. Br. 63) any help to Defendants. Ratifi-
cation, the critical issue in that case (which like the re:st of 
Defe·ndants' cases involved no confidential relation), is not 
supported in any way by the Record in this case. .Addi-
tionally, the Bonded Adjustnlent Conzpany case is com-
pletely inapplicable to this case by reason of the limitation 
of its holding which apperu~s on the face of the decision in 
St. John v. Hendrickson (a case also involving no confiden-
tial relation) cited, quoted and relied on both by the court 
in Bonded Adjustnle·Jd con1pa·ny and by Defendants here. 
In St. J oh~n v. H e·ndri.ckso·n. 81 Ind. 350 (Dfts. Br. 63), the 
court first said : 
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''We fully recognize and a.pprove the rule that a 
party may retain whatever he receives, stand to his 
bargain and recover for the loss caused him by the 
fraud. vV e do not 'menn to run counter to this rule. 
We neither hold nor mean to hold that affirmation by 
retention of the thing bargained for· cuts o If an action 
for dama.ges." 
Having thus circumscribed its position, what follows 
must be read as a holding only : 
''that where a party, 'vith full knowledge of all the 
material facts does an act which indicates his inten-
tion to stand to the contract and waive a.Zl right of 
action for f'raud, he cannot maintain an action for the 
original wrong practised upon him.'' 
It is undisputed on this record that as soon as Plaintiffs 
·secured" full knowledge of all material facts" the,y plainly 
and unmistakably manifested an intention to ·sue (R. 400-
. 402, 449-452). Nothing in the re,cord even remotely sug-
, gests that they had any intention after they acquired ''full 
·knowledge" to ''waive all right of action fo~ fraud''. See, 
for instance, Ex. P -68 and Ex. P -69 ( R. 909-911). 
Preston v. Shields, 156 Pac. 2d 543 (Dfts. Br. 63), in-
volved no fiduciary relation and no fraud. The de·cision in 
that action to quiet title turned on the fact that the plaintiff 
had sat by and permitted defendant to s.eriously change 
its position and spend large sums of money over a period 
of years in discovering oil on the propHrt~ies. But Moreton 
"'lever spent one penny to develop the M & H properties. 
·.'· 1\foreover, there is nothing in the Reeord indicating any 
serious change of position on his part or any prejudice to 
him resulting from the fact that Pl~aintiffs did not sooner 
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discove-r his fraud. If anything, the delay in commencing· 
the action has been a benefit to him in that he has had the 
use of the fruits of his fraud during a period of unparal-
leled national prosperity -vvhich offered countless oppor~ 
tunities for investment and profit to any one possessed of 
such a tremendous sum. 
Neither is Cherington v. Woods, 290 Pac. 2d 266 (Dfts. 
Br. 70) at all relevant to any issue in this case. It involveld 
no confidential re~lationship and no fraud. There the pur-
chase~r of a liquor store had under his contract of purchase 
the express right to examine the books and re-cords of the 
store in order to ascertain the truth of sellers' representa-
tion as to the profitability of the store·; since the buyer 
did not avail himself of this right, the court held that he 
was in no position to complain; the court pointed out 
"there is absolutely no fraud in the record". .And Froelich 
v. United Royalty Co., 291 P. 2d 93 (Dfts. Br. 65)-involv-
ing like all the others no confidential relationship-merely 
announces the rule (inapplicable to this case) that recorded 
instruments constitute notice to subseque1~t purchasers. 
v. 
Replying to D·efendants' Contention That Plaintiffs 
Had Actual Knowledge of the Price (Dfts. Br. Points 
III, IV and V) 
Defendants' attempt to make something of the fact thaJt 
the price of 25¢ per ton was refe·rred to in Rex' letter to 
Dr. Ma.thesius (P. Ex. 14). This they say proves that 
Rex kue\v that the price Coltu11bia paid for the ~I & H 
properties "\\ras 25·¢ a. ton. Ori the record it is clear and 
undisputed even fron1 the· testimony of defe·ndant ]foreton 
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himself that it proves no such thing. As Moreton re.pea~tedly 
stated, 25·¢ a ton was the highest price Columbia was known 
to have ever paid for ore in the State of Utah (R. 602, 603, 
604, 765, 828-832). But, Moreton also said, again and again, 
· that was no indication of what price Columbia would ac-
tually pay for ore in the M & H claim or any other specific 
claim because the actual price to be paid for any specific 
claim, including Plaintiffs' M & H claim, would ·depend on 
:many things ( R. 601-605) including the depth of the ore body 
and whether or not the ore could be readily mined by open 
pit methods (R. 645,, 669, 676, 784, 830, 832). Thus, accord-
ing to Moreton, himself, while Rex and everyone else in 
Iron County might have known that 25¢ was the hig~hes~t 
~price Columbia had eveT paid for ore in that area, neitheT 
:·Rex nor Moreton nor anyone had any way of knowing from 
i: that fact whether or not Plaintiffs would get that highes~t 
price for the ore in their M & H claims ( R. 601, 603, 604, 645, 
. 656, 666-668, 669, 828-832,). Therefore any knowledge- of 
Rex as to the theoretical 25·¢ maximum price per ton cannot 
be said to have been knowledge of the price pe~r ton that 
Columbia was going to pay or did pay for the ore· in the 
M & H claims. And this is made clear by Moreton's own 
testimony (R. 601-605, 656, 669) and e~specially that immedi-
" ately preceding and leading up to his final confession (R. 
828, line 18 to R. 832, line 29'). 
It is impossible to ·see how anyone on the Record in this 
ease could give .serious conside1ration to Mof'eton's testi-
~mony. First of all he was telling a highly improbable 
>Story. It will be remembe,red that according to Moreton 
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there was "bargaining" at the original n1eeting between 
him·self and the Plaintiffs in the Spring of 1946 (R. 624-
625, 631-632). Moreton testified that he told Plaintiffs that 
in ''ordinary and in other cases'' a 50% interest in claims 
''had been given'' to patent ''unpatented claims in the 
area'' (R. 624). He further testified that Plaintiffs refused 
to give hin1 an interest of that size not\vithstanding that 
they did not, according to ~{oreton, dispute that ''in ordi-
nary and in other cases'' 50% had been given. In fact he tes-
tified that they refused to give him any more. than a one-
quarter interest (R. 625). Follo\ving such testimony, De-
fendants then asked the jury and now ask this Court, to 
believe that Plaintiffs who, according to Moreton, were 
unwilling to give Moreton any more than one-fourth in the 
Spring of 1946, thereafter, for no reason sug·gested, became 
willing to give him three-fourths. 
On top of this inherent improbability, there is the fact 
that Moreton was repeatedly and crushingly impeached 
during his. performance on the witness stand at the trial. 
For instance, Defendants describe an alleged statement 
which Moreton testifie·d he made to Rex Holland and Rex' 
answe·r thereto as follows: '' ~1:oreton told the co-owners 
'I am making a big profit out of this transaction, as you 
well kno",'", on the tonnage, and the 25¢ per ton', to which 
statement Rex re,plied, 'I think you are'" (Dfts. Br. 79). 
This conversation, Defendants claim (Dfts. Br. ·79-), was 
never denied. But the fact of the matter is that it was com-
pletely and thoroughly denied, and it "'"as denied by Moreton 
hin1self. Immediately after tlris testimony that Defendants 
have quoted, Moreton \Yas confronted \Yith contradictory 
testimony from his own deposition (R. 775 lines 26 to 29, 
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r77 line 28 to 779 line 25)' and shortly thereafter broke 
lown and completely and irrevocably impeached and de-
;,troyed himself when he testified ( R. 832) : 
'' Q. Will you now tell me when it was that you 
told the Hollands and M urie, for the very firs.t time, 
that Columbia was paying 25 cents a ton for the 
M & H claims? A. I never told them that at any 
time. 
"Q. You never told them? A. No." 
Over and over again at the trial Moreton was similarly 
embarrassed and impeached (R. 616-630, 664 line· 1 to 668 
line 23, 669-673, 700-704, 775·-779, 781-788, 789, 831-832). 
vV e mention this only to shO\V that More,ton 's testimony is 
so absolutely unworthy of belief that the trial court could 
not appropriately predicate any ruling upon it. Indeed, it 
is res:pectfully submitted that any reliance placed on More-
ton's te:stimony by the trial court must on this Record be 
considered to have been an abuse of discretion. 
We, of course, do not know that the trial court's action 
was based on Moreton's testimony. However, we; further 
respectfully submit, we do not know (since the court wrote 
no opinion)-what else it could have been based on. We 
can see no other basis. We submit there is none. 
It has been said that ''The courts will not lightly seize 
upon some small circumstance to deny relief to a party 
plainly shown to have been defrauded" (Victor Oil Co. 
v. Drum, 148 Cal. 226, 193 P. 243, 249, cited and quoted in 
Adams v. Harrison, 93 P. 2d 237, 244) ye.t, we submit, in 
this case relief was denied to parties plainly defrauded 
without the showing of any circumstance for such denial. 
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Defendants in their Brief talk about the deprivation of 
constitutional rights (Dfts. Br. 94-100). But that complaint 
could be more appropriately made by Plaintiffs, for the 
action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict of 
the jury and entering judgment for defendant ~Ioreton not-
\vithstanding the jury's verdict (all without explanation or 
opinion and in the very teeth of a Record such as this) 
actually amounts, in effect, to nothing less than an unwar-
ranted deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional right to a 
trial by jury. 
It is respectfully submitted that the serious error of 
the trial court in this case cannot be permitted to stand 
and that the relief requested in our original brief should 
be given. 
Earnestly and sinceTely urging· all of the foregoing this 
brief is 
Re·spectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, RoBERTS & BLAcK 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTS 
NICK c. SPANOS 
WILLIAM JEROME PoLLACK 
Counsel for Appellants 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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